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Abstract
Background: Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are often proposed as ‘technological fixes’ for
problems facing healthcare. They promise to deliver services more quickly and cheaply. Yet research on the
implementation of ICTs reveals a litany of delays, compromises and failures. Case studies have established that
these technologies are difficult to embed in everyday healthcare.
Methods: We undertook an ethnographic comparative analysis of a single computer decision support system in
three different settings to understand the implementation and everyday use of this technology which is designed
to deal with calls to emergency and urgent care services. We examined the deployment of this technology in an
established 999 ambulance call-handling service, a new single point of access for urgent care and an established
general practice out-of-hours service. We used Normalization Process Theory as a framework to enable systematic
cross-case analysis.
Results: Our data comprise nearly 500 hours of observation, interviews with 64 call-handlers, and stakeholders and
documents about the technology and settings. The technology has been implemented and is used distinctively in
each setting reflecting important differences between work and contexts. Using Normalisation Process Theory we
show how the work (collective action) of implementing the system and maintaining its routine use was enabled by
a range of actors who established coherence for the technology, secured buy-in (cognitive participation) and
engaged in on-going appraisal and adjustment (reflexive monitoring).
Conclusions: Huge effort was expended and continues to be required to implement and keep this technology in
use. This innovation must be understood both as a computer technology and as a set of practices related to that
technology, kept in place by a network of actors in particular contexts. While technologies can be ‘made to work’ in
different settings, successful implementation has been achieved, and will only be maintained, through the efforts of
those involved in the specific settings and if the wider context continues to support the coherence, cognitive
participation, and reflective monitoring processes that surround this collective action. Implementation is more than
simply putting technologies in place – it requires new resources and considerable effort, perhaps on an on-going basis.
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Governments and corporations – both private and public –
have placed great hope and expectation in the capacity
of technological innovation in general, and information
and communication technologies (ICTs) in particular, to
play a significant role in overcoming the structural ten-
sion of rising costs and the need for fiscal restraint in
the delivery of public healthcare services [1-4]. Digital
ICTs have been enrolled in telemedicine to enable re-
mote consultations [5,6] and telemonitoring to allow
patients to undertake routine testing and data transmis-
sion and enabling remote surveillance by clinicians or
clerical workers [7,8]. For all this enthusiasm, the sig-
nificant gap between the high hopes and expectations of
policy-makers and managers and the actual practice of
implementation of these technologies has been highlighted
by research which has consistently revealed an extensive
catalogue of delays, compromise and failure [9-14]. It
appears that technological interventions do not slip
seamlessly into established practice but instead they
meet with resistance and rejection because they threaten
established work and organisational routines or clash
with established professional identities and power rela-
tions [15-20] We also know that interventions that
‘work’ in one setting or speciality may not work else-
where [21,22].
Much research about health technologies has sought
to understand why interventions do, or more frequently
do not, get embedded in practice [10,23,24]. A great deal
of research in this area has been characterised by an
assumption that there is an ‘it’ (i.e. a technology) that
is implemented – rather than seeing the ensemble of
work practices and social relations that shape each
other to bring a technology into use. This focus has
helped to identify a variety of barriers and facilitators
to successful implementation but less attention has been
paid to wider strategic, political or workforce issues. In
terms of research design, with a few notable exceptions
[25,26] this work has relied on case studies focussing on
specific occupational groups (e.g. doctors or nurses) and
their response to particular technological interventions.
While this has been excellent at revealing the complex
and particular processes that shape particular outcomes,
it has not enabled systematic analyses of wider issues,
especially the tricky problems associated with transfer-
ring a technology from one setting to another.
So, while policy pushes the case for new technologies
to deliver healthcare improvement, the empirical litera-
ture continues to highlight an implementation gap. We
‘know’ that there are myriad barriers to success. This
paper reports a project which explored how an innova-
tive ICT was successfully brought into use by a range
of different staff in different settings. Specifically we try to
understand how a particular computer technology becomes
normalised; how a technology becomes embedded in
work practices and in different healthcare settings.
Computer decision support systems in healthcare
The focus of our study was a single technology, a com-
puter decision support system (CDSS) deployed in differ-
ent emergency and urgent healthcare settings. CDSS are
computer programmes designed to assist with decision-
making. CDSS typically combine an expert knowledge
base with an algorithmic or inference based set of rules
which guide or inform decisions. CDSS have become
increasingly popular in healthcare, and have diffused
rapidly across the NHS, for example to support GP
prescribing e.g. ‘PRODIGY’, [27] and diagnosis and
treatment decisions by doctors and nurses e.g. Odyssey
‘TAS’, [28]. In clinical consultations these technologies are
used to structure questioning, gather patient information
and to synthesise these with clinical knowledge to support
or inform diagnosis and treatment decisions. CDSS have
been developed for use by non-clinical staff, notably in
emergency medical care where they have been successfully
used to help manage and prioritise the dispatch of ambu-
lances. CDSS are promoted as helping to standardise and
structure work, allowing staff to work more efficiently,
safely, or faster, or enabling substitution or reallocation
of tasks [29].
The CDSS of interest here is used to support the
provision of a telephone-based service in which call-
handlers assess and prioritise calls from patients (or their
carers) to assign them to appropriate care provision. This
CDSS is an expert system built on an extensive clinical
evidence base subject to a continuous process of evidence
review and update. A series of logical algorithms (path-
ways) underpin questions which a call-handler uses to
ask the caller/patient to determine the clinical skills re-
quired to provide care, and the timeframe in which they
must be accessed. The call-handlers work in a large
open plan office (call centre) and sit at a desk facing two
computer screens. Each has a headset to receive incom-
ing telephone calls and works through questions on the
screens, clicking on appropriate ‘answers’ and typing
free text information as necessary. The particular CDSS
studied offers some flexibility in how the questions are
phrased, and prompts are suggested which allow the
call-handlers to probe for details and work through the
linear algorithm or ‘pathway’ and reach a ‘disposition’ -
a recommended course of action, which can include
immediate 999 ambulance request, referral to a range
of different primary care services, or suggestions for
self-care. Call-handlers typically work 10–12 hour shifts
and cover the whole 24 hour period. In addition to the
call handlers a number of other staff work in or near
the call centre area (supervisors, clinical support staff
and trainers). Each of the call centres in this study was
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(NHS Ambulance Trust or Primary Care service) and
this meant that that senior managers and other health
service professionals and staff worked nearby.
The literature on this type of healthcare call-handling
work is necessarily limited as this is a relatively new
mode of healthcare provision. To date published work in
this field has mainly looked at nurse-led call-handling
[30,31] in part because the extension of this telephone-
based service to a non-clinical workforce is so new. To
our knowledge, the research reported here is the first
comparative case study of a CDSS used by clinical and
non-clinical call-handlers in different healthcare settings.
Of course, computer assisted call-handling has a
longer history in settings outside healthcare, notably
the finance and insurance sectors. Contemporary socio-
logical critiques of this type of work have pressed the
case for seeing call-handling in the context of global-
isation of capitalism and labour substitution [32],
Taylorised mass production and control [33] and in
terms of power and resistance [34]. While these analyses
are powerful, and have highlighted aspects of expertise,
performativity and normative constraint, we nonetheless
felt that it was important to explore how digital ICTs
were being enrolled in the everyday practice of healthcare
work. In particular we sought an approach that would
focus on the collective social action of call-handling and
technology use and show how workforce relations were
located within the ‘special’ context of health services
and the particular social norms that frame and constrain
this sphere of action.
Research approach
The CDSS we studied was designed to allow non-clinical
staff (as well as clinical staff), to make comprehensive
clinical assessments of telephone callers to emergency
and urgent care services. We carried out a cross-case
comparative study this new technology in three different
healthcare settings: ‘999’ emergency care, a GP out of
hours (‘OOH’) urgent care service, and a new ‘single point
of access’ (‘SPA’) service for urgent and unscheduled care.
We drew on Normalization Process Theory, or NPT
[35,36] to provide a theoretical lens for our empirical
and methodological analyses. NPT is concerned with
‘how and why things become, or don’t become, routine
and normal components of everyday work’ (36 p 535)
and it defines four core mechanisms that shape the
social processes of implementation, embedding and
integration of ensembles of social practices. These dy-
namic and interrelated domains are ‘coherence’ – the
extent to which an intervention is understood as
meaningful, achievable and desirable; ‘cognitive partici-
pation’ – the enrolment of those actors necessary to
deliver the intervention; collective action – the work
that brings the intervention into use; and ‘reflexive
monitoring’ – the on-going process of adjusting the
intervention to keep it in place. We used these do-
mains to provide a framework for our findings in each
of the three case studies and as a way of integrating
our findings across the three cases.
The choice of NPT was a deliberate one. Our research
team included social scientists from sociological, psycho-
logical and health services research backgrounds and we
sought a robust theoretical framework for our analysis
which could be practically and appropriately applied to
the comparative study of the CDSS in the chosen set-
tings. We were familiar with a number of theoretical
approaches which might be loosely collected under the
heading ‘Science and Technology Studies’ (STS) which
had grown out of sociological research and parallel
Sociotechnical network approaches which drew on so-
cial informatics and computer science. Both of these
perspectives attempted to go beyond a naive techno-
logical determinism and argued instead that technolo-
gies such as ICTs should be understood as socially
shaped and comprised of dynamic interrelationships
between people, artefacts, practices and structures.
Reviewing these fields we considered using Actor
Network Theory [37,38] but discounted this because
we felt that while this helpfully alerted us to the im-
portance of networks of human and non-human actors
it focussed more on the performative aspects of technol-
ogy in use and had less to say about the normative
constraints and the environment (with perhaps the not-
able exceptions of Callon’s [39] study of markets and
MacKenzie’s [40] classic examination of the nuclear
missile industry). Similarly while sociotechnical inter-
action networks [41] helpfully capture the social co-
construction of technologies and wider ecology of the
networks surrounding them we were minded to concur
with Meyer’s [42] assertion that these provided a re-
search strategy rather than theory.
We also considered stances that apply psychology and
economics to the problem of understanding technologies
in use. These include the Theory of Planned Behaviour
[43] and the Theory of Rational Action/Rational Choice
Theory [44] both of which assure the centrality of action.
We were concerned that these tended to focus on human
behaviour (and neglect non-human actants which we
felt were important) and over-emphasise instrumental-
ity. While these approaches had a considerable track
record in experimental research they appeared to per-
form less well when applied to ethnographic research of
the type we were proposing. Likewise the Technology
Acceptance Model [45] appears to offer a hybrid of ra-
tional action approach and diffusion theories [46,47]
which can explain adoption, appears less well suited to
examining embedding and normalisation.
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citly for examining the types of phenomena we were in-
terested in, namely technologies in everyday use, the
work of normalisation and the practices of embedding
[48]. As the theory is relatively new, we were also keen
to explore the use of the constructs of this theory as a
structured approach to data interpretation to add to the
early corpus of empirical applications of this approach
to demonstrate how it might align with the other theor-
etical perspectives we have noted above.
Methods
Ethical approval for this study was given by the Wiltshire
Research Ethics Committee (REC 08/H0104/56) in August
2008.
This paper focuses on ethnographic data from our
study. This method was chosen to capture the complex-
ities of social interaction in a naturalistic rather than
experimental way. Greenhalgh and Swinglehurst [49]
provide a particularly helpful discussion of the merits
of this approach for studying ICTs and organisational
practices. We used non-participant observation conducted
over 20 months, at different times and days of the week
across the three sites. This observation focused on the
call-handlers using the CDSS but we also observed other
staff, including clinical supervisors (999 and SPA site),
ambulance dispatchers (999), GPs (OOH) and their
interactions with each other and the CDSS. The ob-
servation was purposively structured to capture activity at
different times of day/days of the week and covered all or
part of a shift depending on the setting (between 4 and
8 hours). The observational fieldwork included informal
conversations with staff and in addition we interviewed
staff and stakeholders (policy makers, commissioners,
system developers, managers) using a semi-structured
topic guide developed from our knowledge of the rele-
vant literature and initial observations. Detailed notes of
each observation period were overtly taken and tran-
scribed soon afterwards and these included verbatim or
near verbatim statements. All details about the nature
of calls and the triage process were anonymised.
Call-handler interviewees were purposively sampled
and interviews were conducted during working hours at
points in the day/evening when the service was less busy
(with the agreement of shift managers). They were given
the study participant information leaflet and time to
consider if they would like to participate. Stakeholders
and managers (including policy-makers, commissioners,
system developers, corporate and operational managers)
were also approached and provided with a participant
information sheet and a time for the interview was
arranged if they agreed. Call-handler interviews typic-
ally took 30–45 minutes because of the constraints of
their work patterns, other interviews were between
60–90 minutes. Where possible, interviews took place
in a private office or meeting room but in OOH some
interviews took place in the call centre room. All the
interviews were recorded. The interview topic guide
was adjusted to reflect the experience and seniority of
each participant. Alongside the observation and inter-
views we collected documents concerning the CDSS
design, training materials and reports and this was
used to inform our analysis.
Analysis
The data were analysed, initially via systematic reading
and open coding, undertaken independently by five
members of the research team and then in collaborative
meetings [50] which allowed discussion of emerging
themes. A sixth member of our team (CM) had been
closely involved in the development of NPT so as a way
of enhancing the validity of the coding we deliberately
excluded him from this analytical process to reduce the
possibility that we would simply ‘fit’ t h ed a t ai n t ot h e
domains offered by NPT. Our coding discussions formed
the basis of an agreed coding frame, and where there
were disagreements about codes we attempted to re-
solve these amongst the coding team calling on CM for
advice and clarification about the theory to inform this
consensus as necessary (whist there were a number of
early disagreements in the coding process we found that
were able to resolve these satisfactorily amongst the
team). We used NPT as a framework for the coding and
analysis combined with a thematic approach, using con-
stant comparison [51] to examine codes and refine
emerging themes to augment the understanding offered
by the NPT domains. To support the analysis we wrote
narrative data summaries and used matrix/charting
[52,53] techniques to facilitate comparison. As the study
progressed, the analysis was structured to examine all
the data within each setting, and then across the settings
using our research questions and the framework pro-
vided by Normalization Process Theory.
Results and discussion
We collected nearly 500 hours of observational data over
approximately 35 days at each site between November
2008 and August 2010 (Table 1). A total of 61 interviews
Table 1 Observational data - time spent in each setting
Setting Number of hours Number of days Time period
999 170 41 Nov 2008 – Jul 2010
SPA 172 33 Oct 2009 – July 2010
OOH 149 27 Sept 2009 – Aug 2010
Total 491 101 Nov 2008 – Aug 2010
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Below we present the analysis of these data for each site
in turn before discussing the implications of these find-
ings for understanding the implementation and embed-
ding of this technology.
Emergency call-handing for ‘999’
Prior to the introduction of the CDSS in the ambulance
service, 999 emergency calls were handled by non-
clinical staff using a basic classificatory system (Criteria
Based Dispatch) which meant taking a name and address
and, usually, dispatching an ambulance. In contrast, the
CDSS offered a comprehensive triaging system built on
a clinical evidence base, for use –by call-handlers who
receive 12 days training on using the computer system
and are not required to have clinical training. The CDSS
was promoted by the Department of Health, who had
trialled it and vouched for its safety but it was also
supported by ambulance service managers, and call-
handlers themselves, keen to dispatch ambulances more
appropriately:
The benefits for me were not taking some people to
hospital and only responding vehicles to people who
really needed it. (Control room manager)
It wasn’t that long ago a good ambulance service took
everyone to hospital but now it’s all changed. Now it’s
about how many patients we can keep out of hospital
safely. (Senior Manager)
These beliefs were tied to imperatives for rationing,
in the face of rising demand and seen as an opportunity
to discipline patients, especially ‘inappropriate’ callers
with non-emergency problems, and also to support for
‘evidence based medicine’–whereby formal knowledge
bases (systematic reviews, expert systems, etc.) based
on the accumulation of good practice replaces knowledge
vested in and accumulated by individual clinicians. Trust
in the system was high, because it was built on this
externalised expert knowledge, making it safe for non-
clinicians to use:
Call-handler explains that the CDSS has been
designed by ‘a huge group of people...non-clinicians,
clinicians - lots of input...it’s a very safe system to use,
used correctly’. (Observation notes)
Drawing on NPT we can say that the combined rhe-
torics of safety, rationing and medical expertise meant
that the coherence of the innovation was strong: it made
sense for the range of participants involved, from policy
makers to individual call-handlers. However, coherence
alone does not explain why the technology was success-
fully brought into everyday use: in principle support
for innovation has to be translated into participation
and action. Interestingly, despite the general communal
specification of coherence, each of the actors participat-
ing in the implementation of the CDSS did so for dis-
tinctive reasons. For the Department of Health, the
CDSS offered the chance of a high profile technological
success – much needed given all the promises about
harnessing technology to achieve NHS modernisation.
This general goal was shared by the CDSS developers,
b u tt h e yw e r ek e e n– of course – to see their particular
CDSS used, and were prepared to work very hard to
make it work in this site. The Ambulance Trust man-
agers also had specific local ambitions:
We’ve always been in the forefront of new things, new
initiatives ...projects. ...you can guarantee if
something’s going to happen, we will be at the forefront
of that and we’ve got a reputation for that, of wanting
to try new things and wanting to push the boundaries
a little bit further, so, it didn’t surprise us when we
won the pilot for [the CDSS]. (Senior Manager)
For the call-handlers, there was less choice about
participation – their use of the CDSS was imposed on
them by their managers. However, we know from pre-
vious studies that this is not always sufficient to make
an intervention work e.g. [54]. The active buy-in of
the call-handlers was important to successful imple-
mentation. In practice, this was achieved because of a
strong commitment amongst the call-handlers to dis-
ciplining ‘time-wasters’ (the inebriated and those with
minor ailments who should not be calling 999), although
alongside this the call-handlers had some concerns that
the CDSS might ‘de-skill’ them (something that we return
to shortly). In addition to the human actors enrolled at
999 the CDSS had to link to other technological devices
systems and geographical and demographic databases –
for example maps showing incident and ambulance
Table 2 Interviewees by role and location
Staff /stakeholder group Location
999 SPA OOH External all
Call handler 6 15 12 1 34
Call supervisor/ manager 3 4 3 1 11
Other call centre staff 1 n/a n/a 1 2
Clinical 3 1 4
Senior manager 6 1 1 8
CDSS Developers n/a 2 2
Government level n/a 3 3
Total 38 17 9 64
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handling. To summarise in NPT terms, we can see
how cognitive participation – the enrolment of the
actors necessary to make the intervention work –
took place in this case. Notably, attention to cognitive
participation shows that diverse motivations for par-
ticipation were contained within the broader discur-
sive formation of coherence.
So far, so good, strong coherence and cognitive partici-
pation were established around the intervention. How-
ever, bringing the CDSS into use required concerted
action from all the actors involved, particularly the call-
handlers who had to use the system in their everyday
practice. Here we found that whilst the system was
effectively brought into use, it was not in the way en-
visaged at the start: making it work involved some
surprising compromises. Specifically, whilst the CDSS
‘promised’ a combination of Evidence Based Medicine
and de-skilling, in practice the call-handlers’ experienced
up-skilling – learning to navigate multiple information
systems, and engaging in extended and often very difficult
conversations with callers:
[The CDSS] is harder, and it’s easier, if you know what
I mean. It’s harder because you’re having to get a lot
more information and you seem to, sort of, everything’s
on top of you ...(Duty Manager)
Furthermore, while the CDSS was expected to control
the knowledge in play the call-handlers continued to
draw on and develop experiential knowledge and exer-
cise discretion around personal and organisational values
not programmed into the software. In the following ex-
ample, a call-handler over-rode the CDSS disposition, to
allow an ambulance dispatch where none was indicated.
She says:
...“that was naughty...sometimes you let your heart
rule your head”.[ ...] There were two main reasons
why she overrode the disposition 1) she was an elderly
lady who was anxious, 2) there were difficulties in
communicating - both her speech and her hearing -
was making it a lengthy procedure. The patient had
already spoken to [another service] and to the
ambulance service. If the call was referred on the
patient would be required to speak to a third agency.
She felt that this call was going to take a long time to
resolve, potentially leading to further distress for the
patient. She [the call-handler] justified her actions by
saying “I haven’t done an override recently...”
(Observation notes)
The development of experiential expertise and the use
of tacit knowledge and discretion has of course been
highlighted in other organisational research such as the
call centre studies noted earlier, and in classic studies
like Suchman’s analysis [55] of how creative improvisa-
tional reasoning underpins ‘plans and situated actions’ .
What is novel here is that this CDSS offered these non-
clinical staff an opportunity to perform clinical identity
and gain some additional status and authority. Despite
the introduction of an extensive auditing system, these
discretionary practices and outcomes were tolerated. In
NPT terms, we see the importance of the wider institu-
tional setting within which the collective action is taking
place: how implementation takes place at the point of
interaction between established and emergent rules,
practices and identities. The call-handlers effectively
operationalized the innovation and built shared under-
standings of how this could be done, but this was not
exactly as expected. Indeed, tolerance for unanticipated
outcomes and willingness to moderate expectations and
processes was key to embedding the CDSS in this site.
Throughout the implementation process, the Depart-
ment of Health, the developers and the Ambulance
Trust were attentive to the need for incremental adjust-
ments, a process referred to as reflexive monitoring
within NPT. For example, whilst extensive call-audit
procedures were introduced alongside the CDSS, which
could have been used to ‘police’ the call-handlers very
closely, in practice these procedures operated with a
tolerance that allowed call-handlers to adapt phrasing
and use some of their ‘own’ knowledge in managing
calls. This call-handler discretion helped make the sys-
tem work and possibly also reduced staff turnover by
making the job more satisfying. The managers also
found it necessary to introduce new ‘clinical supervi-
sors’ (typically a nurse or paramedic) to support the
call-handlers in dealing with complex or non-standard
cases. Whilst the developers tried to accommodate
these kinds of cases within the software, this proved in-
effective, and the presence and actions of clinical super-
visors effectively legitimised ‘fuzzy logic’ in the day-to
-day operation of the CDSS. The Trust also provided
additional clinical training for the call-handlers to help
them understand symptoms (e.g. explaining what hap-
pened when someone had a stroke). This, combined
with the presence of clinicians reinforced the sense that
call-handling work has a strong clinical component,
making their work both possible and rewarding. The in-
teractions between these human actors and the tech-
nology and interpretive flexibility in everyday use of the
CDSS led to continual evolution of the system. We
know from Science and Technology Studies [37,38] that
technologies are never fixed or finished and this was
true at 999 where the CDSS developers continued,
some 2–3 years into deployment, to upgrade and adapt
the system.
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Single Point of Access (SPA) was a new service, using
the CDSS to triage callers and direct them to the rele-
vant primary care services. The call-handler was able to
book appointments with appropriate care professionals
(commonly a GP) and could also book patient transport
for this. The call-handler could also offer self-care ad-
vice, prescribed within the CDSS, if indicated. The
service was operated by the same ambulance trust as 999
above, as a new venture – both for them (this was the first
time they had delivered non-emergency services) and
more generally (this was the first attempt to link primary
care services in this way).
As for 999, the CDSS was seen as a way to improve
healthcare delivery, specifically as a way to integrate and
rationalise out-of-hours services. This was an important
Department of Health priority that resonated with local
managers:
...we’d already realised that, ...the whole health care
model’s becoming so complicated it’s difficult to
navigate your way, way through it; it’s not the patient’s
fault that they don’t know how to, how to access and
who to access and that the NHS...should get its act
together and make this as easy as possible. (Senior
manager)
Based on their experience with 999 the managers were
confident in the CDSS and, indeed, believed that they
could employ staff with the same skill set as 999, and
that this would – eventually - enable staff to work flex-
ibly across urgent and emergency care, maximising ef-
fective workforce management.
I would like to think that they would all ...be skilled
to take all levels of calls. I think if we start to carve
out different types of calls coming to different, then you
sort of lose that, the capacity. If they are all trained to
take the 999 calls, then when they’re not doing an
urgent call, they can pick up a 999 call and vice versa.
So I think it’s, you know, you have better use of
resources if they’re all trained up to take all calls.
(Senior manager)
For the developers SPA was an opportunity to extend
the use of their system, to demonstrate its value more
widely. For senior managers, the advantages of the CDSS
were even greater than in emergency care:
The big prize will be to apply it to those callers who
would previously have phoned their GP in-hours
because they had an unscheduled care need or they
would have phoned their doctor out of hours...or they
would have phoned NHS Direct...And my belief is
that [the CDSS’s] true worth will then be...truly
exhibited. (Senior manager)
Again, framing this using the domains of NPT, the
intervention made sense to the key actors in SPA because
of commitment to integrated care. But the need for coher-
ence and buy-in was rather different in this case, com-
pared with 999. First, because successful implementation
required buy in from primary care and community ser-
vices and, as part of this, integration of the CDSS with a
range of external technological systems (e.g. appointment
booking). And second, because the service recruited new
call-handlers, who – by default – did not share any of the
999 call-handlers’ reservations about the CDSS and had
no pre-existing practices to be adjusted or accommodated.
Nonetheless, the everyday practice of SPA call-handling
using the CDSS proved to be highly complicated as dif-
ferent pathways through the CDSS algorithms resulted
in different dispositions (e.g. call an ambulance, wait
and see your GP) so that achieving an agreed outcome
with the caller could be difficult:
...the final disposition was a 19 minute ambulance.
The call-handler explained that an ambulance was
going to be on its way but the patient did not want an
ambulance: she refused it. So the call-handler called
the clinical supervisor and clicked on early exit. He
then arranged an appointment at one of the primary
care centres at 6.50pm, by selecting a PCC from the
list and clicking on the option book appointment. He
confirmed the appointment to the caller and then
filled in a box on care details with some brief
comments on the case. (Observation notes)
A conversation between a developer, clinical supervisor
and researcher comparing 999 and SPA. The clinical
supervisor mentions that she thinks that the work
requires a “different skill set”. The developer thinks
that, in some ways, the out-of-hours work is more
difficult, and describes it as having “more complexity”.
She says that some call-takers might be suited to one
type of work rather than the other. She characterises
the difficulties of the different types of work broadly as:
on the one hand emergency work is stressful/requires
thinking on your feet/acting quickly/confidently, on the
other hand, out-of-hours work is complex, less
straightforward, and more time consuming – requires
patience. She notes that “there are some fantastic
[999] call-takers” but she says that she think some of
them might find out-of-hours work “a bit boring” in
contrast to the “adrenaline” involved in 999 work.
(Observation notes)
The everyday work that it takes to make the interven-
tion work is different in these two different cases. In
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factors, including the skills required for specific forms of
work, and the teamwork required to link aspects of the
work (particularly important in SPA).
In the initial phase of SPA, considerable resources
were allocated to ensure that problems which arose were
dealt with swiftly. For example managers and developers
worked shifts alongside the call-handlers during the
initial implementation phase to ‘trouble shoot’ and fix
problems as they arose. SPA also benefitted from the
lessons learnt in 999 – for example the introduction of
clinical supervisors and the handling of the audit
process. In this sense, the reflexive monitoring pro-
cesses, highlighted by NPT were transferrable across
settings. The clinical supervisor role was also added in
the SPA setting; indeed it was seen, in this context as a
necessity, providing clinical input, partly because the
system was viewed as necessarily over-cautious:
if you are uncertain, ...you can go to a supervisor
and be reassured that you are doing the correct thing.
Whereas, I think, if you didn’t have a clinical
supervisor you would always err on the side of
caution...perhaps, sending an ambulance when you
wouldn’t necessarily need one. [ ...] So it's really good
to have somebody who has the medical knowledge in
the room, should you need them. (Call-handler)
Whilst at 999 the introduction of new practices to
enable reflexive monitoring occurred alongside the intro-
duction of the CDSS, many of the audit and monitoring
practices were firmly in place when the SPA service com-
menced and were easily accepted by call-handlers. They
reported deriving a sense of competency, of being ‘good
at what they do’,f r o mp a s s i n ga u d i t s ,a l t h o u g hi ti s
worth noting that the SPA call-handlers did not have
target rates for dispositions, a particularly unpopular
aspect of auditing in 999.
Thus we see that coherence about the technology had
to be established at SPA, in part built on the foundational
sense-making achieved in 999, but also built around new
service integration and delivery. New staff had to be
enrolled into bringing the CDSS into everyday use,
and this entailed longer and more complex negotiations
with patients, a broader range of dispositions than found
at 999 and some subtly different ways of auditing and
monitoring practice. Turning to our final case study, our
theoretical framework allowed us to systematically exam-
ine similarities and differences once more.
General practitioner out of hours service
Located in a different Trust, on the other side of England,
the Out of Hours (OOH) service introduced the CDSS
in response to new national care standards. Satisfaction
with the existing system was high amongst the man-
agers, GPs and call-handlers:
we were very happy with it; it worked very well. Like I
said, we won an award ...because it was so effective.
The PCTs locally were very happy and they’ve audited
it. And we have a clinical governance system that
reviews calls and the outcomes of the calls, and the
performance of the operators, the GPs, nurses, etc.
(General Practitioner)
The positive, with using that system, was that the calls
used to take on average 2 minutes .... with the old
system, they didn’t need as many operators, so it was
more cost effective. (Call-handler)
This presented a different challenge for those promot-
ing the new system – to achieve coherence they had to
persuade the relevant actors that the new system would
be as good, if not better, in a context where there was
little ‘shop-floor’ imperative to make a change. Conse-
quently, the new CDSS was not presented as an alterna-
tive but as a similar way of doing the task, but in a way
that met new bureaucratic requirements.
The main advantage is that it’s a nationally
recognised system. It’s obviously gone through all the
Royal Colleges, it’s been agreed, and so from a
litigation perspective, a medico-legal perspective, it’s
very safe and secure. So that gives us real security, the
fact that it’s good. [ ...] But, basically, [it] is very, very
similar. It works in a similar way to the way we do
our [old] protocols. (Senior Manager)
In this way, the managers attempted to build on co-
herence around the old system to build support for
the new one. This said, they were also keen to reduce
demands on doctors’ time and to direct callers to al-
ternative dispositions or offer self-care advice and this
entailed additional roles for the call-handlers’ and led
to some ambivalence about the CDSS:
There's nothing that I can say that I think it is better
than the way we were doing it, not at the moment. It
is, first line triage done by non-clinical staff, for half
the price that you're going to have to pay a nurse. If
that’s good, if that’s saving people money, that’s fine,
but they're asking people who have 60 hours training
and not a medical background at all, to do what
they're doing, and sometimes I think, oh dear [laughs].
(Call-handler)
Also, unlike the other settings, the CDSS was intro-
duced in OOH before all the call-handlers had been
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6 months. This made buy-in more problematic – why
change when there is a functioning system in place? In
response the CDSS developers (themselves anxious to
secure an exemplar of the CDSS in use in OOH) pro-
vided significant additional support at this site. Mean-
while, a key player from the Department of Health took
it upon himself to actively promote the CDSS to key
stakeholders, lending additional credibility. Nonethe-
less, there was resistance from call-handlers here, some
of whom were concerned about how much buy-in there
was amongst the range of actors implicated in delivery:
Quite often there’ll be a heated discussion going on
somewhere of people really that are just running it
down, and probably people that have never used it.
I mean, the doctors obviously haven’t... they don’t
h a v et ou s ei tb e c a u s ew e ’re using it, but there’sa
lot of negativity about it. I don’tk n o ww h a tt h e
answer is to that one, but it’st h eo l ds a y i n g :y o u
need to get the people in charge or the right... the
people at the top need to be in, trained and
confident with it before we start pushing it up at
the bottom. (Call-handler)
I nt h ee v e r y d a yp r a c t i c eo fu s i n gt h eC D S S ,t h e s e
call-handlers also had to implement extended questioning,
and the time taken for each call went up. Whilst the
demands were not as heavy as for the other two sites –
999 call-handers dealing with life and death emergen-
cies and SPA call-handlers with multiple primary care
services - the call-handlers in OOH still required an
increased level of understanding:
You’ve got to drive it and you’ve got to have the
knowledge and the background to work with that
because you’ve got to understand the inference of what
it is that you’re asking. If you don’t understand what
you’re asking, you’re not going to be able to use it
effectively. (Call-handler)
Notably, the call-handlers here had a strong commit-
ment to one particular outcome: giving callers access a
GP. This was what they had done before, and it was
what they expected to do now. Whilst the CDSS was
supposed to triage, and therefore deny access to some
callers, the call-handlers would work ‘around’ the sys-
tem, often exiting the CDSS before the final disposition:
Call-handler: If it's children’s coughs, colds and flu
and things, then fine, I will [...] let it go where it
wants to go. And if it goes ‘to pharmacy within three
days’, then that’s fine, but that’s not what the patient
wants to hear. The patient has rung us up because
they want to see a doctor or a nurse, not because they
can see a pharmacy in three days. But I will let it take
me and then they will say well no, I want to see
somebody. So that’s wrong.
Q: You have an early exit and you will...
Call-handler: Yeah, give the patient an appointment.
But then you know it's taking you where it's supposed
to take you but the patients don’t want that, they have
expectations other than seeing the pharmacist in
Tesco’s in three days. (Call-handler)
Reflexive monitoring at OOH was somewhat different
to 999 and SPA because existing audit systems were less
developed and there were fewer staff resources. Initially
there was only one member of staff responsible for all
training and auditing (compared to the 999 and SPA set-
ting, which had a team of about six trainers/auditors).
Whilst all OOH call-handlers were audited in the same
way as SPA and 999 they only received feedback on their
performance if they failed an audit. As a consequence,
some call-handlers seemed unaware whether or not they
had been audited. However, despite this emphasis on
using monitoring to identify bad practice, there was still
acceptance of flexibility in using the CDSS. Interpretive
flexibility was legitimated by general practitioners and
managers, and was most apparent in call-handler deci-
sions to not use the CDSS for certain types of calls (e.g.
palliative care patients):
...for the patient who’s at end of life, [where it’s] not
possible to answer questions on the telephone, and
you’re asking for a specific type of pain or, and they’re
obviously, they can’t answer you. It’s not appropriate
to put them all the way through questioning when you
wouldn’t be leaving them for two hours or six hours
anyway. You would want them to be seen as quickly
as possible. So there’s no point in putting them through
the torment of taking a load of questions, for them to
be asked all over again by the doctor. So in areas like
that, it’s not really appropriate to assess them.
(Manager)
As a coda to this case, towards the end of our research
the OOH service took on reception work at the local
Urgent Care Centre located in an acute hospital, using
the CDSS to triage face-to-face encounters. Initially it
was assumed that the work that would be required to
implement the system in the new setting was well
understood from the original OOH experience, but this
was not the case. Face to face work required additional
skills, including negotiating with more than one person
simultaneously - often a patient came to the desk with a
carer or family member, or using visual and non-verbal
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asking the patient) to support assessment; in effect
coherence and participation had to be established and
reprised once again in this new environment.
Discussion
Our analysis shows how the ‘same technology’ was used
distinctively in different settings reflecting important
differences in the nature of the service and care pro-
vided and the social interactions between workers,
stakeholders and service users. Previous research has
alerted us to the fact that the implementation of tech-
nologies depends on the interplay of technology and
the workforce in everyday practice [55-57]. Our study
has extended this understanding by using a theoretical
framework to enable cross-case comparison and iden-
tification of the mechanisms underpinning successful
implementation. We have shown, using NPT how co-
herence was achieved around the CDSS despite local
context variation. Across all three sites there was
agreement that the CDSS was suitable for the (varied)
tasks and that appropriate resources were in place to
enable effective implementation, although these varied
between settings. There were differences between set-
tings where the CDSS replaced an established system
with existing staff and where the service and/or the
staff were new and the work of establishing coherence
had to be altered to reflect this. It was clear that
knowledge, experience and work identities built through
doing call-handling work influenced the coherence of the
CDSS for staff in the different settings. What is especially
interesting in the wider policy context – where this same
CDSS is now being used to support a national ‘111’ urgent
care service [58] is that coherence was not just a local
‘problem’, it was necessarily underpinned by wider under-
standings and discourses for example about the necessity
of rationing and the need to modify caller/patient be-
haviour and beyond that the very legitimacy of evidence
based medicine and the kinds of expert knowledge
which underpinned the CDSS.
In all three settings key players were successful in
enrolling a diverse network of people and technologies
to bring the CDSS into use. We have shown that man-
agers in 999 and OOH had to work harder to enrol
call-handlers because of their prior use of a different
technology, and the CDSS developers had higher engage-
ment with the 999 setting which built trust and fostered
enrolment and legitimation of the CDSS. Considerable
effort was expended in enrolling staff although not all
were in the same position regarding the CDSS – for
example call-handlers had little power to resist its
introduction if they wanted to retain their employ-
ment. What is important however is that the technol-
ogy was implemented despite, or even because of, the
emergent processes by which the call-handers and
stakeholders understood, engaged with and reinterpreted
implementation – a finding that is supported by a previous
study of a similar healthcare decision support system [59].
Again, referring to the framework provided by NPT,
we have seen how implementing and using the CDSS re-
quired collective purposive action. In 999 call-handlers
used the CDSS in the management, categorisation and
prioritisation of emergency calls and it was viewed posi-
tively despite the apparent intensification of their work.
In SPA the CDSS facilitated the management of urgent
care calls, sorting by urgency and enabling referral to
services and/or the giving of health advice but it also
extended this work beyond that done in 999; calls were
longer and required more probing questions. In OOH
the CDSS managed calls to out-of-hours care and face-
to-face attendees at an Urgent Care Centre and here
their work was extended and had become more scripted.
Earlier studies of call centre operators – largely in non-
healthcare settings - identified similar features and noted
the demanding nature of call centre work, but this re-
search has tended to focus on issues of management and
surveillance (see for example [60,61]) rather than imple-
mentation. For the purposes of understanding imple-
mentation what is important is that deployment of this
CDSS and embedding it in practice, changed the work
and the workers in each setting. Call-handling used ex-
pertise based on discretion, negotiation and translation
skills and required emotional labour. The skills created
and sustained by introducing the CDSS included experi-
ential, embodied and clinical expertise, and in turn this
work offered an identity as ‘health workers’ and not as
generic call centre operatives. This identity appears key
to the recruitment and retention of these staff [62]. De-
ployment of the CDSS also disrupted some existing divi-
sions of labour and hierarchies, for example, at 999 and
SPA a new role – clinical supervisor – was introduced.
Although similar monitoring, appraisal and adaptation
mechanisms keep the CDSS in place across the three
settings, there were once again, differences in how these
mechanisms were operationalised. For example the
formal audit processes were undertaken differently in
OOH, where the processes were more covert and focussed
on identifying poor practice, compared with 999 and SPA
where audit was seen more as a positive learning tool.
Successful deployment of the CDSS entailed significant
and long-term involvement from the developers includ-
ing the need to adapt the system for each setting. One
of the questions for further roll out of the CDSS will be
how much this input can be reduced to implement the
system at scale. It is worth noting that all three sites
devoted considerable additional staff resources to sup-
port call-handlers, including clinical supervision (999
and SPA only) and audit and training staff.
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We have argued that implementing the CDSS and
maintaining its everyday use was enabled by the collect-
ive action of a range of actors who established coherence
and secured participation and engaged in on-going ap-
praisal and adjustment to keep the technology in place.
This effort was necessary to bring the CDSS into use
and continues to be required to keep it working. As well
as detailing how the same technology was implemented
in three different settings this paper has demonstrated
how NPT can be harnessed to provide a theoretical
framework to structure cross-case analyses. Not every-
thing that is technically possible will work in practice,
but we can save time and money – and fulfil more hopes
– if we can develop robust ways of understanding where
effort invested is most likely to be successful. By using
NPT we have been able to examine how sites differ in
key respects – but also discern patterns and features
which can help identify generative mechanisms that
might, in turn, inform the implementation of these kinds
of technologies in the future.
Our analysis has shown that the CDSS must be under-
stood both as a computer technology and as a set of
practices related to that technology, kept in place by a
network of actors in particular contexts. The four do-
mains of NPT - collective action, coherence, cognitive
participation and reflexive monitoring play out differ-
ently in each setting even where the same technology is
employed. The three settings are characterised by differ-
ent ‘work’ and different workforce characteristics and
while there might be a common core of training or
skills, the content and format of this varies across the
three settings. The ability and divisions of labour created
and sustained by introducing the CDSS are not just
those required to operate a computer system ‘by rote’
but are also about individual experiential, embodied ex-
pertise and team sharing of knowledge within a particu-
lar context or environment.
To our knowledge this is the first ethnographic study
of a single CDSS used in three different emergency and
urgent care settings. Our ethnography offers rich detail
but like other case study research can be criticised as
having limited generalizability. We have attempted to
address this by deliberately employing a robust middle
range theory (NPT) to provide an analytical framework
that allows for comparison and explanation of how this
technology was successfully brought into everyday, rou-
tine, use. Nonetheless we concede that the three settings
studied may not be typical of similar services, and it
remains for further research to test the reach of our
interpretations. In addition we note that our research
was located in particular moment in the development
of the CDSS technology and of the life of each of the
organisations studied. Some of what we observed was
temporally contingent; for example, we suspect that
the coherence and cognitive participation of future
deployments of the CDSS will be strongly influenced
by the sense-making and enrolment of the cases we
studied as healthcare organisations learn from earlier
adopters. A final limitation concerns the use of NPT.
As noted earlier this theory is a relatively young mid-
dle range theory and our study is one of an emerging
body of empirical applications of NPT. Other theoret-
ical approaches might offer additional and no doubt
different insights about the use of this particular CDSS.
Our use of NPT means that we have paid less attention
to the structures of networks keeping the technology in
use (as Actor Network Theory might) or to organisa-
tional psychology (as the Theory of Planned Behaviour
would). However we have demonstrated that this ICT
has established some legitimacy amongst a range of
users, who have been effectively enrolled in its deploy-
ment, who have collectively acted to bring it into use
and who undertake the necessary reflexive tasks to keep
it in play: in short we have explained how – unlike so
many digital technologies in healthcare – the CDSS has
been normalised.
Our research in these three different settings suggests
that the CDSS has a strong chance of embedding in the
long term and becoming routine in these services. How-
ever, we need to recognise that although single technolo-
gies can be implemented in different settings, this takes
more effort than simply slotting a technology into place.
Successful implementation has been achieved, and will
only continue to be maintained, through the efforts of
those involved in the specific settings and if the wider
context continues to support the coherence, cognitive
participation, and reflective monitoring processes that
surround this collective action. Not least, technological
interventions may require new resources to support
their effective use, for example, requiring new roles, new
organizational functions and considerable management
time, all – perhaps – on an on-going basis.
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